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In this issue...
There is reason to question whether employers bear all – and
employees none – of the investment risk in defined-benefit pension
plans. So are they just defined-contribution plans in disguise?
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THE PENSION PAPERSWith the relative decline of defined-benefit (DB) pension plans in Canada, pension
experts have stepped up their focus on the relative advantages of DB plans compared
to defined-contribution (DC) plans, and whether steps should be taken to shore up
the popularity of DB plans. 
Common perception has it that in DB plans, plan sponsors (firms) bear the
investment risk, and in DC plans, plan members bear the risk. The purpose of this
study is to explore the question of how the bearing of investment risk is distributed
in DB plans. This task requires a closer look at the proposition that employer-
sponsored pension plans represent deferred wages. This closer look, in turn, requires
a re-examination of how employers and their employees “trade off” pension benefits
for other components in the total compensation package.
The key findings of the paper include:
￿ The defined-benefit formula notwithstanding, members of DB plans may bear
substantial investment risk. The key issue is the extent to which members of
DB plans grant wage or other concessions based on the contributions made by
the plan sponsor, including any additional contributions required as a result of
investment shortfalls.
￿ Even if members of DB plans bear substantial investment risk, there is a
fundamental difference between risk bearing in DB and in DC plans. In 
DB plans, unlike DC plans, there exists the possibility of intergenerational
risk sharing. 
￿ In a DB plan, but not in a DC plan, the financial consequences of the adverse
investment outcome would be shared by all members of the plan. The
potential for intergenerational risk sharing (or insurance) in DB plans is an
important and an attractive feature of these plans.
￿ While there is a strong case for clarifying the ownership rights to investment
surpluses that may emerge in DB plans, the argument that sponsors are
entitled to plan surpluses because they bear all of the downside risk of
investment performance may not withstand closer scrutiny.
This paper focuses attention on the uncertain state of our knowledge regarding the
manner in which wages or other forms of compensation are “traded off” for
pensions in DB plans. The paper also reminds the reader that, based on economic
analysis, employees ultimately bear the cost of DB (and DC plans), even if the
employer and the employee ostensibly “share” these costs.
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P
ension plan coverage for
Canadians is evolving in both 
its nature and extent, raising
concerns about the potential impli-
cations for the pension system and 
its participants. Statistics Canada
reports that, between 2002 and 2006,
membership in defined-benefit pension
(DB) plans increased by 1.45 percent
(from 4,534,941 to 4,600,581
members). However, membership 
in defined-contribution (DC) plans
increased by 12.22 percent (from
796,088 to 893,403 members).
As a result, there has been a relative decline in the
importance of defined-benefit plans in Canada.
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Meanwhile, the proportion of the labour force in
Canada that is covered by employer-sponsored
pension plans continues to decline, from 44.2
percent of paid workers in 1985 to 38.5 percent
in 2005. 
Pension plan experts, with considerable
consternation, are examining the potential
implications of these trends. In particular, the
relative decline of DB plans has served to focus
renewed attention on their advantages and
disadvantages compared to defined-contribution
plans,
2 and whether efforts should be made to
shore up the popularity of DB plans. For example,
the Guiding Principles of the Ontario Expert
Commission on Pensions answer the latter
question in the affirmative. They underline: “the
importance of maintaining and encouraging the
system of defined benefit plans in Ontario.”
3 One
frequently raised concern is that members of DC
plans bear all of the investment risk. As a result,
many commentators view the relative decline in
DB-plan coverage as shifting additional risk to
plan members, with an attendant increase in the
degree of uncertainty as to the amounts of the
pensions to be delivered by Canada’s system of
occupational pension plans. In a Discussion Paper
released in February 2007, the Ontario Expert
Commission  wrote:
Defined benefit pensions are fixed, rather
than tied to fluctuations in the sponsor’s
business fortunes or to investment returns
experienced by the plan. Accordingly, the
risks associated with low investment
income, for example, are borne by the
sponsor(s) of the plan. (Page 3).
The purpose of this study is to explore the
question of how the bearing of investment risk is
distributed in DB plans. This task requires a closer
look at the proposition that employer-sponsored
pension plans represent deferred wages.
4 This
closer look, in turn, requires a re-examination of
how employers and their employees “trade off”
pension benefits for other components in the total
compensation package.
This Commentary is organized as follows. First, 
I provide background on the widely accepted
definitions of DB and DC plans and the related,
overly simplistic assumptions about who bears 
risk in them. Second, I review the concept of
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The author thanks the members of the C.D. Howe Institute's Pension Advisory Panel  for their useful comments.
1 I have been advised that the data compiled by Statistics Canada may understate the increase in membership in DC plans. Such would be the
case, for example, if Statistics Canada were to treat all members in a closed DB plan as DB plan members even if new members are effectively
DC plan members. 
2 The relative decline of DB plans, which is less pronounced in Canada than in the United States, also raises the question of why these plans
have become less attractive to employers in the private sector.
3 The Minister of Finance in Ontario, in November 2006, appointed an Expert Commission on Pensions “to examine the legislation that
governs the funding of defined benefit pension plans in Ontario, the rules relating to pension deficits and surpluses and other issues relating
to the security, viability and sustainability of the pension system in Ontario.” (“Improving Ontario’s Pension System: Ontario Expert
Commission on Pensions’ Terms of Reference.” November 2006).
4 In the early policy literature, pension plans were often viewed as reflecting the generosity of a benevolent employer, rather than a benefit for
which employees paid by making concessions elsewhere in their compensation package.| 2 Commentary 266
employer-sponsored pensions as deferred wages.
Third, I discuss the type of labour market in
which members of DB plans could not be forced
to bear any investment risk, but note that it is not
the type of labour market in which firms would
sponsor DB plans. Fourth, I review the
incomplete state of our current understanding of
the manner in which wages and other benefits are
traded off for pensions in DB plans. Fifth, I
discuss the capacity for intergenerational risk
sharing in DB plans, which differentiates these
plans in an important way from DC plans.
Finally, I draw together the implications of this
analysis for an understanding of the way in which
the bearing of investment risk differs in DB from
DC plans. 
The key findings of the paper include:
￿ The defined-benefit formula notwithstanding,
members of DB plans may bear substantial
investment risk. The key issue is the extent to which
members of DB plans grant wage or other
concessions based on the contributions made by the
plan sponsor, including any additional contributions
required as a result of investment shortfalls, rather
than the defined-benefit formula. Even if members
of DB plans bear substantial investment risk, there is
a fundamental difference between risk bearing in DB
and in DC plans. In DB plans, unlike DC plans,
there exists the possibility of intergenerational risk
sharing. In a DC plan, if there is an adverse
investment outcome as a member approaches
retirement, the unfortunate consequence may be a
significant decline in the pension (annuity) that can
be purchased with the accumulated investment
proceeds. In a DB plan, the financial consequences
of the adverse investment outcome would be shared
by all members of the plan. The potential for
intergenerational risk sharing (or insurance) in DB
plans is an important and an attractive feature of
these plans.
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￿ While there is a strong case for clarifying the
ownership rights to investment surpluses that may
emerge in DB plans, ownership claims by plan
sponsors cannot be reliably based on the argument
that plan members do not participate in the
downside risk of investment outcomes. The
argument that sponsors are entitled to plan
surpluses because they bear all of the downside risk
of investment performance may not withstand
closer scrutiny.
In a research paper prepared for Ontario’s Expert
Commission on Pensions, entitled “Arguments
about Asymmetry of Risks and Rewards and
Deferred Wages in Pension Plans,” James Wooten
concludes: “If a plan is ongoing, employers bear
the burden of a deficit caused by adverse
investment experience or other actuarial losses.” In
arriving at this conclusion, Wooten draws attention
to the fact that because “employers are legally
obligated to fund deficits, it is difficult for them to
shift this burden to employees.” Although
employers may bear the initial cost of these
contributions, it does not follow that these costs
cannot ultimately be shifted back to employees.
In addressing the above issues, this paper focuses
attention on the uncertain state of our knowledge
regarding the manner in which wages or other
forms of compensation are “traded off” for
pensions in DB plans. The paper also reminds the
reader that, based on economic analysis, employees
ultimately bear the cost of DB (and DC plans),
even if the employer and the employee ostensibly
“share” these costs.
6
The Background: Standard Definitions
and Overly Simple Assumptions 
In DB plans, the pension due at retirement is
determined by a formula that links the pension
to the member’s years of service and earnings
or, as is generally the case in the unionized
private sector, to the member’s years of service
multiplied by a fixed dollar amount. To finance
the promised pension payments, the employer
is required to set up a pension fund, and is
legally responsible to make additional
C.D. Howe Institute
5 There is no reason that intergenerational sharing of investment risk should favour one age cohort over another. By contrast, if life expectancies
continue to rise and additional contributions are required as a consequence, there could be a net transfer of funds from younger to older age
cohorts.
6 This comment assumes that the total compensation of workers is determined in competitive labour markets, as would be the case in the
private sector.Commentary 266 | 3
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7 For a recent review of important court decisions as to the ownership of plan surpluses in DB plans in Canada, see Selody (2007).
8 Because the supply of labour is very inelastic in the long run (i.e., insensitive to changes in the real wage rate), economic analysis indicates that
the burden of employer contributions to the Canada Pension Plan is borne mostly by workers. This appears to be the understanding of most
policymakers as well.
9 In response to the sharp decline in the level of the risk-free real interest rate (as evidenced by the real interest rate on the Real Return Bonds of the
Government of Canada), the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan has lowered its estimate of the long-term, risk-free rate of return to 2.5 percent. As a
result, employer and employee contribution rates have been increased sharply, from 7.3 percent of earnings up to the Year’s Maximum Pensionable
Earnings (YMPE) and 8.9 percent of earnings in excess of the YMPE in 2006 to 10.4 percent of earnings up to the YMPE and 12.0 percent of
earnings in excess of the YMPE in 2009. The reduction in the assumed risk-free real rate of return going forward might be treated, for analytical
purposes, as the equivalent to a series of realized investment returns beneath the level that had previously been projected. 
The fact that the employer contribution rate has been increased does not imply that the employer ultimately bears this cost, a point well
understood by economists. The experience with the Teachers’ Pension Plan raises the interesting question of whether the implicit risk sharing
is different between, on one hand, DB plans that set high contribution rates by costing using a risk-free interest rate and, on the other hand,
plans where contribution rates are lower based on costing with a higher interest rate consistent with the plan holding riskier assets.
contributions if the return on the fund is below
the rate deemed necessary to discharge the
pension obligations.
In DC plans, the pension due at retirement is
equal to the accumulated value of the contributions
made on the member’s behalf. The replacement rate,
which is the ratio of the member’s pension to the
member’s earnings just prior to retirement and serves
as the standard measure of pension adequacy, is
inherently uncertain since the accumulated value of
contributions depends upon the investment
performance of the pension fund.
In textbook descriptions, the fundamental
difference between DB and DC plans resides in the
bearing of investment risk. Plan sponsors bear
investment risk in DB plans, while plan members
bear investment risk in DC plans. In DC plans, the
inherent uncertainty in the replacement rate is a
cause for concern in the view of some commen-
tators, who call for policy initiatives designed to
reverse the relative decline in DB plans in order to
provide more certain pensions for plan members.
The textbook description of the bearing of
investment risk in DB plans, even to a casual
observer, is too simple. Many would point to the
legal uncertainty as to the ownership of plan
surpluses that emerge from favourable investment
performance.
7 If employees share in plan surpluses
that emerge from favourable investment
performance, but plan sponsors are legally required
to finance shortfalls, the bearing of investment risk
in DB plans is asymmetric. To address this issue,
and to relieve the potential disincentive for sponsors
of DB plans to fully fund their plans, some
observers have recommended that the legal status
of pension surpluses be clarified to provide plan
sponsors with an unambiguous claim to surpluses
arising from favourable investment performance.
The above description of the bearing of
investment risk in DB plans, although more
complicated than in the textbook treatment, is still
too simple. In particular, it is not clear that plan
members may participate only in surpluses that arise
from favourable investment performance. There is
reason to suspect that they may ultimately bear the
consequences of plan deficits as well.
Who Ultimately Bears the Risk in DB Plans?
Economists distinguish between the impact of a
tax and its ultimate incidence in recognition of the
fact that the ultimate burden of a tax – who
ultimately pays the tax – is likely to reflect the
time elapsed since its introduction and the
behaviour of the affected agents. For example,
although a statute might provide that a payroll tax
is to be paid by the employer, the ultimate
incidence of the tax may fall upon employees
through a combination of wage and/or price
adjustments.
8
In principle, the ultimate incidence of
additional employer contributions to a DB plan
required by poor investment performance could
fall exclusively upon employees. If there is an
unanticipated shortfall, due to adverse investment
outcomes, employees could eventually bear the
cost through reductions elsewhere in their
compensation package, or in the case of
contributory plans, by increases in the employee
contribution rate.
9 Conversely, if investment| 4 Commentary 266
performance is unexpectedly strong and employer
contributions decline, then employees could
eventually receive higher wages or greater benefits
than would otherwise be the case. If so, it would
be plan members – not employers – that bear
investment risk in DB plans.
If the full incidence of employer contributions
ultimately falls upon employees, members of DB
plans would bear investment risk in a manner
similar to members of DC plans. The impact,
however, would differ. In DB plans, fluctuations
in investment performance would result in
changes in the wage or other concessions required
to pay for pension benefits. In DC plans,
fluctuations in investment performance would
result in changes in the amount of the members’
pensions. Risk-shifting would occur, the formal
terms of the DB plan notwithstanding, if formal
or informal bargaining takes into account all of
the required employer contributions. The
mechanism for risk shifting would be the
internalization, into cash wages or other fringe
benefits, of all ongoing costs to the sponsor of
financing the DB plan.
Pension Benefits as Deferred Wages
The notion that the pensions provided by
employers represent deferred wages is widely
accepted by economists. In his research report
prepared for Ontario’s Expert Commission on
Pensions, Professor Morley Gunderson writes: 
“… the most reasonable conclusion is that there 
is some evidence of a trade-off between wages 
and pension benefits, but the evidence is at best
fragile.”
This is a less than overwhelming endorsement
of the view that pensions represent deferred
wages. However, as noted by Professor
Gunderson, the empirical task of identifying the
trade-off between wages and pensions is made
difficult by severe limitations in the requisite data.
Where pensions are the subject of explicit
negotiations, as in collective bargaining, the
evidence of a trade-off is strongest.
To an economist, the view that pensions are
deferred wages is motivated largely by principle. If
workers do not ultimately bear the cost of
pensions (and ignoring any indirect benefit to
firms of sponsoring pension plans, such as
incentive effects), firms that sponsor pension
plans are providing a gratuitous transfer of wealth
from shareholders to employees. To an economist,
this is not a reasonable result.
Diverging Views: Do Employers or Employees
Pay the Cost of Contributions?
It merits note that the comments of many
observers suggest that employers – not 
employees – are likely to bear the cost of
employer contributions to DB plans. Ontario’s
Expert Commission on Pensions, in its
Discussion Paper, writes:
These recent changes in the asset mix of
pension funds, in their increased volatility,
in their actuarial valuation and in
accounting practices, have all triggered
demands for sponsoring employers to
increase contributions to their pension
plans in order to avoid or retire deficits.
Arguably, these increased contribution
levels may have two effects. First, they
may persuade employers to postpone or
resist the introduction of additional
benefits. Second, employers may
increasingly come to perceive pensions as
a major cost centre, to focus on the
difficulties of managing the volatility of
pension costs, and to seek ways to
mitigate their pension risk, all to the
potential detriment of defined benefit
plans and the workers who depend on
them. (Page 6).
The divergence between the economists’ view that
pensions are deferred wages and the frequent
references in the writing of non-economists to the
effect that employers bear the costs of higher plan
contributions may reflect the difference between
the initial and the ultimate incidence of higher
employer contributions. If labour markets are
competitive, and if employees value one dollar
C.D. Howe InstituteCommentary 266 | 5
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10 If plan members value the present value of the pension benefit less than dollar for dollar, and thus are willing to forgo less than a dollar of cash
wages for a dollar of discounted pension benefits, then the firm has no incentive to sponsor the DB plan unless there are other benefits to the
firm, such as lower cost of retraining if the DB plan serves to reduce employee turnover.
A referee has suggested that, in the vast majority of cases, the “cost of pensions … is decoupled from cash compensation.”  Economic
studies – for example, Gunderson, Hyatt and Pesando (1992) – find that there is a trade-off between wages and the present value of pension
benefits in collectively-bargained, flat benefit plans in Ontario. In the non-union sector, it may be more difficult to find evidence of a trade-off,
especially in the short run. In this context, the question of why a firm would sponsor a DB plan if it did not receive wage concessions or other
advantages in the long run would have to be addressed.
11 As noted by a referee, the task of identifying normal contributions is complicated by fluctuations in the risk-free rate of interest (assuming that
the promised pension benefits are, in fact, risk free).
12 Selody acknowledges that the ultimate incidence of employer contributions may differ in the event of a prolonged series of favourable or
unfavourable events. Selody writes:  “A shock such as a surprisingly high or low rate of return on the pension fund or an unexpected change in
the longevity of members, however, will result in the sponsor having to inject or withdraw funds to secure the payment of future benefits. If the
shock persists, contributions should be adjusted to reflect the shock.” (Page 3).
(present value) of pension benefits as much as one
dollar of wages, then – through a combination of
wage and/or price adjustments – the higher
employer contributions will ultimately be shifted
to plan members.
What exactly does it mean to say that pensions
are deferred wages and that workers “pay” for the
DB pensions to which they become entitled by
concessions elsewhere in their total
compensation?
A straightforward answer might be that
employees forgo wages in a given period equal to
the present value of the pension benefit to which
they become entitled during that period.
10 In this
event, the wages forgone by DB members would
depend upon neither the size of the employer’s
(normal) contribution, which could vary for a
given benefit formula with the actuarial
assumptions adopted by the employer, nor any
special contributions required by the employer to
finance an unanticipated funding deficit.
Selody (2007), in contrast, offers an explicit
statement of the way in which wages might be
traded off for employer contributions in DB
plans. Selody writes:
Contributions can be made either directly
by members or indirectly by employers 
on behalf of members. Conceptually, it
does not matter who makes the contribu-
tions, since all contributions are part of
members’ total compensation and are
earned by members. The employer sets
total compensation (cash and benefits) 
to a competitive value determined by
market forces. This value will converge
over time to the marginal product of the
members’ labour contribution to the firm
on average. Contributions are distinct
from sponsor injections and withdrawals
into and out of the pension fund. Sponsor
injections and withdrawals are a claim on
the shareholder equity or wealth of the
sponsor. (Page 3).
Selody suggests that workers “pay” for the normal
contributions to the plan made by the employer,
in the form of reduced cash wages or concessions
elsewhere in the compensation package.
11
However, in the event of unexpectedly favourable
or unfavourable investment performance, share-
holders pay in the form of special contributions
or withdrawals.
12
The question of whether members of DB plans
bargain over benefits or contributions is central to
the understanding of how investment risk is
distributed in DB plans. Importantly, as I show in
the next section of this paper, the type of labour
market in which members of DB plans would be
able, theoretically, to make wage concessions solely
on the basis of the defined-benefit formula is not a
market in which DB plans are likely to exist.
An Analytical Approach
Are there labour markets in which members of
DB plans would be expected to bear none of the
risk of uncertain investment outcomes?  The
answer is “yes.” However, such labour markets | 6 Commentary 266
C.D. Howe Institute
13 In this example, I assume that workers treat the pension benefits promised by firms as risk free. But what if they were not risk free? The
promised pensions would be risky if the DB plan could be less than fully funded at the end of the period and if there was a possibility (non-
zero probability) that the firm could experience bankruptcy.
Suppose that the DB pension plan is the only benefit. Then the wage paid to workers plus the present value of the promised pension,
discounted at the risk free rate of interest, would equal the market value of the workers’ services. If the pension were not risk free, the
promised benefit would be discounted by a higher (risky) rate of interest, thereby requiring a smaller reduction in the cash wage in order to
ensure total compensation equal to the value of labour services.
14 As noted by a referee, pensions promised by DB plans in industries where the likelihood of firm failure is high would not be risk free. The
analytical example that I provide in the text is counterfactual in that the condition for members of DB plans to bear no investment risk are
not likely to be met in the “real world.”
15 See, for example, Lazear (1979) for the classic description of this type of implicit contract, with attention to the role of mandatory
retirement as a truncation device. DB plans may help employers attract, through self-selection, employees with a longer-term commitment
to the firm. DB plans, which “back load” the accrual of benefits to older and long-service employees, serve to discourage employee turnover
and thus reduce training costs.
are also unlikely  to be ones in which firms would
sponsor DB plans.
Theoretically, the type of labour market in
which plan sponsors would bear all of the risk for
investment outcomes, and plan members none of
the risk through wage concessions, is as follows.
Each period, workers and firms compete in
competitive markets and the total compensation
of workers is set equal to the market value of
workers’ services. Included in the compensation
package is a DB pension plan. Workers have full
information and, rationally, treat the promised
pension benefits as risk free since firms do not
become insolvent and are legally obligated to
meet their pension promises. Only firms make
pension contributions, and do so at the beginning
of the period. At the end of the period, when the
return on the pension fund becomes known,
firms make additional contributions if returns are
less than projected and withdraw funds from the
plan if returns are greater than projected.
In this model, all of the investment risk in DB
plans is borne by plan sponsors (firms). Suppose,
for example, that the investment return is less
than projected, so that the plan sponsor is
required to make an additional contribution. 
The plan sponsor cannot request that, at the
beginning of the next period, workers accept total
compensation less than the market value of their
services in order to compensate the firm for 
its unplanned contribution to the DB plan. 
This is due to the fact that workers and firms
recontract each period, and workers will not 
agree to work for a firm that provides a
compensation package that is less than the 
market value of their services.
13
This type of labour market undoubtedly exists
in certain segments of the economy. For
industries in which there is a high rate of labour
turnover and/or a high incidence of firm failure,
workers will be paid the market value of their
labour services in each and every period in which
they are employed. Such is likely to be the case,
for example, for employees of small retail firms.
However, in these industries, firms are not likely
to sponsor DB plans, nor is there likely to be
demand by workers to participate in DB plans.
14
The Type of Labour Markets Amenable 
to DB Plans
In other labour markets, however, it is more
reasonable to assume that firms and workers enter
into implicit contracts with a longer time horizon.
In these markets, competitive forces dictate that the
present value of the worker’s services is equal to 
the present value of the worker’s compensation over
the worker’s expected tenure with the firm. These
implicit contracts, for incentive reasons, may
provide for workers being paid less than the market
value of their labour services when young, and
more than the market value of their labour services
when old.
15 The key feature is that firms and
workers need not “settle up” in each and every
period, in light of their ongoing relationship.
This latter type of labour market is where one
would expect to find firms which sponsor DB
plans. Indeed, the very existence of a DB plan is
premised on the firm and its employees having a
long-term perspective on the employer-employee
relationship. In DB plans, there is substantial
“backloading” of benefits:  the value of accruingCommentary 266 | 7
benefits is much higher for long-service employees
who are nearing retirement than for young
employees.
16 As a result, DB plans may serve as a
vehicle through which the deferral of compensation
to a worker’s older years actually occurs.
Unfortunately, for the purpose of drawing
inferences as to the distribution of investment risk
in DB plans, this “implicit contract” model is 
far less clear in its predictions. There is nothing,
for example, which would preclude a firm from
shifting to its employees the cost of an unantici-
pated increase in pension costs as a result of an
investment shortfall. So long as the present value
of the worker’s future compensation exceeds the
present value of the worker’s labour services, the
worker has no incentive to quit the firm.
17
By contrast, in the labour markets where firms
and their workers recontract in each period and
thus ensure that compensation is equal to the
market value of labour services in each period,
there is an unambiguous prediction. Firms, not
workers, would bear the investment risk in DB
plans, so long as benefits can reasonably be
regarded as free of default risk.
18 However, for the
types of firms that are likely to sponsor DB plans,
one would not expect workers to be paid the
value of their marginal product (labour services)
in each period. Under an “implicit contract”
model of the long-term relationship between a
firm and its workers, which would include firms
with a unionized workforce, there is no
unambiguous prediction as to the distribution 
of investment risk. As a result, the issue of the
distribution of investment risk cannot be resolved
at the analytical level, but must be addressed 
as an empirical issue.
Empirical Evidence
Suppose, for example, that workers grant wage
concessions under the assumption that their DB
pensions will be received with certainty. For this
to be the case, the normal contributions required
to finance the promised benefits would be
calculated using the risk-free rate of interest.
19 In
addition, the funds in the pension plan would be
invested solely in the risk-free asset. If the plan
sponsor chose not to invest the pension fund in
the risk-free asset (i.e., the asset which would
insulate shareholder equity from fluctuations in
investment returns, given the plan’s liabilities),
there would be unanticipated increases or
shortfalls in investment outcomes relative to the
returns required to ensure that the plan remains
fully funded. If sponsors choose to bear this risk,
the wage increases received by plan members may
not be affected by changes in required employer
contributions arising from fluctuations in
investment returns.
20
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16 See, for example, Gunderson and Pesando (1988). In a final earnings plan, a wage increase granted to an older, long-service worker
enhances the value of a large number of past service credits. Further, the commencement of the pension is much closer, and thus less heavily
discounted, for older workers.
17 Selody (2007) writes (page 5): “In reality, sponsors cannot recoup the cost of errors because they cannot unilaterally set future total
compensation rates below the rate determined by market forces without undesired consequences.” This is true in a labour market where
workers are paid the value of their labour services in each period, for the reason stated by Selody, but is not true in an implicit or lifetime
contract model of the labour market.
The “implicit contract” model, one should note, does not suggest that workers bear only the risk associated with adverse investment
or other outcomes that increase the cost of the pensions promised under the defined-benefit formula. As noted by a referee, it is unlikely
that young workers would enter into implicit lifetime contracts if risk-sharing were asymmetric, with workers receiving lower wage increases
or making other concessions in the case of unfavorable outcomes but not receiving higher wage increase or enrichments in the case of
favourable outcomes.
18 If there is a non-zero probability that a firm will go bankrupt, then members of DB plans bear investment risk if the plan is not fully
funded (in the absence of the full insurance by a third party of accrued pension benefits).
19 If the DB plan promises a nominal benefit, the risk-free nominal interest rate would be used. If the DB plan promises a fully indexed
benefit, the risk-free real interest rate would be used.
20 The implications of the mismatch between the assets and liabilities of DB plans has received increased attention in recent years, as in Laidler
and Robson (2007).| 8 Commentary 266
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21 Hyatt and Pesando (1996) undertake a preliminary, but ultimately inconclusive, econometric study of whether higher employer
contributions as a result of investment shortfalls impact on negotiated wage increases.
22 Ideally, one would wish to construct a longitudinal data base which contains the full details for several firms of the entire compensation
“package” paid to employees (since unanticipated pension costs can also be shifted back to plan members in the form of fringe benefit
reductions), as well as the relevant pension variables. Employer contributions specifically required to amortize experience deficiencies
resulting from adverse pension fund investment performance would be included. The ideal data set would cover periods of time in which
returns on pension assets fell short of the expectations of plan sponsors, as well as periods of time in which the opposite occurred. In
addition, the ideal data set would permit researchers to construct measures of change in the provisions of pension plans since it is possible
that unexpected employer contributions are internalized within the pension plan itself, through – for example - the expiry of temporary
special retirement “windows” rather than in the level of wages or other fringe benefits. A further confounding consideration that increases
the difficulty in isolating the extent of cost-shifting to plan members is that employers can influence the size of pension plan contributions
by changing the key actuarial assumptions which underlie the valuation of pension plan assets, notably the assumed real rate of return.
23 Beginning in 2007, a temporary change permits experience deficiencies calculated on a wind-up basis to be funded over a period of not
more than 10 years if certain conditions are met.
However, this need not be the case.
Suppose that the contributions required from the
sponsor of a DB plan increase sharply as a result of
a period of adverse investment outcomes. If the
sponsor of the DB plan bears the full risk of adverse
investment performance, these higher plan contri-
butions should have no impact on the wages and
fringe benefits received by workers in subsequent
rounds of formal or informal bargaining. If plan
members receive lower increases in wages and/or
non-pension benefits as a direct consequence of the
employer’s having to make larger-than-planned
pension contributions, then at least some of the
investment risk in the DB plan has been shifted
back to the plan members. If there is a dollar-for-
dollar reduction in the amount of the workers’
wages or other benefits to compensate the employer
for the full amount of the higher pension
contributions, then all of the investment risk in the
DB plan is ultimately borne by plan members.
In the case of favourable investment outcomes,
analogous questions arise. Suppose that the sponsor
of a DB plan is able to take (or is required by law to
take) a contribution holiday as a result of a plan
surplus arising from investment returns that exceed
the rate of return used to cost the plan. Will the
increases in wages or other benefits in succeeding
rounds of formal or informal bargaining be the
same or greater than the increases that would have
otherwise been the case?   In the presence of
favourable investment outcomes, are DB plan
members more likely to receive enrichments to 
past service credits?
In principle, there are two separate questions.
First, is there any impact of fluctuations in required
employer contributions to DB plans on the wages
or other benefits subsequently received by plan
members?  Second, if this “feedback” does exist, is 
it dollar-for-dollar; that is, is the exact amount of
the change in the required employer contribution
reflected in the subsequent change in wages or 
non-pension benefits?
To determine whether investment risk in DB
plans (especially, with regard to adverse investment
outcomes) is shifted to plan members, one might
turn first to evidence from formal collective
bargaining.
Does the amount of the required employer
contribution to the DB plan influence the
negotiated wage and/or the level of non-pension
fringe benefits?  In principle, one might answer 
this question using econometric techniques and
very detailed data on contract provisions, across
firms in the same industry or within firms over
time. Unfortunately, I know of no study that 
has addressed this issue with a data set that is
sufficiently detailed to produce persuasive
findings.
21, 22
If the return on the plan’s assets is beneath the
assumed rate, then the funded status of the plan
will deteriorate. The plan sponsor will then be
required, by law, to make a series of special
payments to amortize the resulting shortfalls,
known as “experience deficiencies.” The Pension
Benefits Standards Act of Ontario requires employers
to fund experience deficiencies calculated on a
going-concern basis over a period of not more than
15 years. As well, they must fund experience
deficiencies calculated on a solvency or wind-up
basis over a period of not more than five years.
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24 Cited in Gunderson, Hyatt and Pesando (1992).
25 A commentator on an earlier draft of this paper has suggested that a relevant test might be to see if members of DB plans make larger wage
concessions when the normal employer contributions to the plan increase, such as would be the case when the federal public-service plan
was costed on the basis of the lower real interest rates available on the Real Return Bonds of the Government of Canada. This suggestion
serves to draw attention to two complicating questions. First, do wages in the federal civil service internalize the value of the DB plan, as
would be the case in a competitive labour market?  Second, over what length of time would one expect wages to internalize higher employer
contributions (even if these are implicit contributions), especially if the event that requires these higher contributions may reverse itself?
While this legal requirement clearly assigns the
initial incidence of the costs of funding deficiencies
on the plan sponsor, the question of the ultimate
incidence remains open.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to find hard
evidence on the ultimate incidence of employer
contributions designed to amortize experience
deficiencies. There is, however, ad hoc evidence
suggesting that the ultimate incidence of these
contributions may be borne by employees as well
as by employers.
In 1988, for example, a survey of trustees (both
labour and management) of Canadian pension
plans, as well as other pension plan administrators
and specialists, revealed that 45 percent of
respondents believe that smaller wage increases
and other enrichments are more likely in the
presence of experience deficiencies.
24
Would retroactive enrichments to flat benefit
pension plans in the union sector be less generous
if employers were required to fund quickly the
unfunded pension liabilities so created?  An
affirmative answer to this question would suggest
that the impact of retroactive plan improvements
on the cash flow of the employer – which
includes pension contributions – does matter. 
If plan members tried to negotiate more rapid
funding of a retroactive benefit enrichment, 
the likelihood would appear to be that union
members would be required to make a
correspondingly greater wage concession in light
of the larger employer contributions. If it is 
also assumed that workers are unwilling to accept
an actual reduction in wages (as opposed to a
smaller increase), one can perhaps understand
why these retroactive enrichments are not
aggressively funded.
The question of whether employees negotiate
over employer contributions to the DB plan,
rather than the pensions provided under the
terms of the DB plan, is the central one.
25 If firms
and workers negotiate over costs, the implication
is that employees bear at least some of the
investment risk in DB plans. If firms and workers
negotiate only over benefits, then the implication
is that members of DB plans do not bear
investment risk.
Intergenerational Risk Sharing 
in DB Plans
Even if it is found that the ultimate incidence 
of all employer contributions to DB plans is
borne by employees, DB plans differ from DC
plans in an important way. DB plans, unlike 
DC plans, provide for the sharing of investment
risks across different generations of workers, 
thus reducing the investment risk borne by
individual plan members.
Suppose, for example, that investment returns
are sharply lower than projected, due to adverse
outcomes in both the stock market and the
market for fixed-income securities. For a member
of a DC plan, especially an older member who is
nearing retirement, the consequences for the
likely pension at retirement are both clear and
adverse. For members of a DB plan, the results
may be strikingly different. The immediate
impact is that the plan sponsor will be required 
to make higher plan contributions in order to
eliminate, over time, the deficit arising from the
investment shortfall. Through formal or informal
bargaining, all workers will – over time – make a
commensurate concession in wages or other
fringe benefits. Older workers who are nearing
retirement will bear only a small portion of the
immediate increase in pension costs necessitated
by the investment shortfall, since this increase is
shared by all workers, of all ages, and takes place
over time. This capacity for members of DB plans| 10 Commentary 266
C.D. Howe Institute
to engage in intergenerational risk sharing has 
no counterpart for members of DC plans. 
Even if there are substantial runs of favourable 
or unfavourable investment returns, inter-
generational risk sharing within DB plans 
should significantly lower each individual plan
member’s exposure to investment uncertainty.
26
In light of the above, and even if investment
risk in a DB plan is ultimately shifted in full to
plan members, one should note that DB plans 
are not simply DC plans in disguise.
Conclusions
The substantive issues raised in this Commentary
are as follows.
1. There are three possible scenarios as to the bearing
of investment risk in DB plans:  (i) plan sponsors
bear the risk of adverse and of favourable invest-
ment performance; (ii) plan sponsors bear the 
risk of adverse investment performance, but share
the risk of favourable investment performance 
with plan members; and (iii) plan members bear 
the risk of adverse and of favourable investment
performance, at least in the long run.
2. Neither economic analysis nor existing empirical
evidence permits a definitive conclusion as to the
manner in which investment risk is distributed
between plan sponsors and plan members in DB
plans. Indeed, the distribution of investment risk
may vary across plans, according to the “pension
deal.” In the absence of definitive evidence, it is
not appropriate to argue (for example) that plan
sponsors are entitled to plan surpluses because
only plan sponsors bear the downside risk of
investment performance.
3. To answer the question of how investment risk 
is distributed in DB plans, one must seek to better
understand the manner in which pension benefits
are traded off against other forms of compen-
sation in formal (the union sector) or informal
bargaining. Do workers forgo wages or make
other concessions based on (i) the size of the
employer’s contributions to the plan or (ii) the
pension benefits promised under the terms of 
the DB plan?
4. If workers’ wages are adjusted to reflect the
contributions made by employers to their DB
plans, which may be high due to the need to
finance investment shortfalls or low to reflect the
existence of surpluses arising from favourable
investment outcomes, the implication is that plan
members bear investment risk, at least over the
intermediate to longer term.
5. As many commentators have noted, there are
advantages to clarifying the ownership rights to
plan surpluses, including those that arise from
favourable investment outcomes. If plan sponsors
were provided with an unambiguous claim to 
the ownership of surplus assets, the result would
be to remove a potential disincentive to plan
sponsors from fully funding their DB plans.
However, the argument that plan sponsors should
be provided with the proprietary right to plan
surpluses because they bear the downside risk 
of investment performance has, in the opinion 
of this author, not yet been established (nor, 
for that matter, refuted).
27
6. The view that pension benefits represent deferred
wages is now widespread, if not universally
shared.
28 In spite of this fact, the precise nature of
26 Investment risk is not less in DB plans than in DC plans if both hold similar portfolios. Rather, as noted by a referee, the impact of favourable
or unfavourable investment outcomes may be effectively “smoothed” by the capacity for intergenerational risk sharing in DB plans.
27 In deciding how surplus assets might be divided between plan sponsors and members, one would wish to take into account trade-offs
between pensions and other forms of compensation as indicated by past practices of the firm or the history of the collective bargaining
relationship. A strategy for firms wishing to assert their rights to pension surpluses would be to show that the costs of pension fund
shortfalls would be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices, or shareholders in the form of lower profits, rather than to workers.
28 If there is a decline in the risk-free nominal interest rate, so that the normal cost of an unindexed DB plan increases, will this higher cost be
shifted back to employees?  Similarly, if there is a decline in the risk-free real interest rate, so that the normal cost of an indexed DB plan
increases, will this higher cost be shifted back to employees?
Several referees draw attention to this issue, and use the lack of apparent evidence of this cost shifting as a challenge to the view that
employees “pay” for the cost of their DB benefits. If the decline in the risk-free nominal rate of interest proves to be permanent (which, I
would suggest, is not yet established), and if sponsors conclude that this higher cost cannot be shifted back to their employees, an economist
would predict that firms would close DB plans to new membership or forgo any enrichments to the DB formula. Since DB plans with
indexed benefits are largely - if not exclusively - public sector plans, the lack of apparent shifting of costs could reflect the failure of wages in
the public sector to internalize pension benefits.Commentary 266 | 11
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the trade-off between pension benefits and other
components of employee compensation, including
cash wages, is not clear. Additional research into
the nature of this trade-off would be valuable 
not only in the present context, but also in the
assessment of related questions. For example,
rational and well-informed workers will grant
smaller wage concessions for enrichments to DB
plans in which benefits are perceived as risky, due
to a combination of less-than-full funding and 
the possibility of the bankruptcy of the plan
sponsor. If workers belong to a poorly funded
plan sponsored by a firm that is experiencing
financial distress, economic analysis suggests that
workers would grant smaller wage concessions 
for given benefit enrichments than would be the
case for workers who belong to a well-funded 
plan sponsored by a solvent firm.
7. There is much discussion, at present, of the
attractiveness (or lack thereof) of “marking to
market” the value of a firm’s pension assets and
liabilities, so that shareholders may be provided
with full information as to any unfunded liability
that may represent a claim to shareholder equity.
29
The purpose, presumably, is to facilitate the
internalization into share prices of the present
value of future – and not yet funded – obligations
of the firm to its employees via the vehicle of its
DB plan. However, if employees will pay at a
future date for required employer contributions
via reduced wages or concessions elsewhere in the
compensation package, the unfunded pension
liabilities identified by accounting statements do
not represent a claim on shareholder wealth. 
If markets are efficient, and if the above is fully
understood by market participants, such
unfunded liabilities should not serve to depress
share prices. If employees will pay for a portion
of the required employer contributions, then
unfunded pension liabilities will depress share
prices, but not on a dollar-for-dollar basis.
30
This paper has not attempted to provide a
comprehensive assessment of the advantages and
disadvantages of DB plans compared to DC
plans.
31 One conclusion, however, is clear. If plan
sponsors do bear all of the investment risk, then
members of DB plans clearly bear less risk on this
account than do members of DC plans. However,
even if the bearing of investment risk in DB plans
is ultimately shifted back to employees, the
capacity for intergenerational risk sharing reduces
the exposure of individual plan members to
unexpectedly adverse (or favourable) investment
outcomes. This is an especially important
consideration for those DB members who are
approaching retirement. 
29 See, for example, Laidler and Robson (2007) and Selody (2007).
30 When market participants receive new information, such as that a firm is experiencing financial distress, an analogous issue must be
addressed in order to assess the change in the value of shareholder equity: to what extent will the consequences of this distress be shifted to
other stakeholders, such as the firm’s employees?
31 Ontario’s Expert Commission on Pensions observes that Ontario’s labour force may be becoming more mobile, and individual workers in
the future may work for a larger number of employers. It is straightforward to address the issue of portability for DC plans, but not for DB
plans.Expert Commission on Pensions (Ontario). 2007.
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